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THE CLOG ON THE EQUITY OF
REDEMPTION AND ITS EFFECT ON
MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCEt
JEFFREY L. LICHT*

I.

BACKGROUND

Consider this not terribly hypothetical scenario. D, a commercial real estate developer, approaches L, an institutional lender,
seeking a commitment for long-term financing of a proposed construction project. Negotiations are commenced with experienced

attorneys representing both sides. L finally offers to provide the
necessary funds in the form of a fixed interest rate mortgage loan,
provided that D grants L an option to acquire a part ownership
interest in the property upon completion of construction. D agrees
and the deal is formally consummated. Construction proceeds to
completion. L provides permanent financing as agreed. Now, L
seeks to exercise the option, but D resists. Can L obtain specific
performance?
If this were strictly a question of contract law, the answer
would clearly be yes.' However, in view of the 345 year old rule
against clogging the equity of redemption,2 the considered response

can only be "maybe."
The clogging doctrine was originally developed by English eqt The author wishes to thank Robert M. Zinman, Vice President and Investment
Counsel, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham
University Law School, for his review and critique of early drafts of this article and
countless constructive suggestions during its preparation.
* B.A., Queens College, 1974; J.D., Fordham University Law School, 1984. The author
is an attorney in the Real Estate section of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
I See generally 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1441B (3d
ed. 1968) (examples of specific enforcement of options); 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1197 (2d ed. 1964) (same).
2 See infra note 16 and accompanying text. Despite the widely held view that the rule
arose in 1639, two commentators have suggested that the doctrine's roots go back to a far
earlier day. See Preble & Cartwright, Convertible and Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclog-

ging the Equity of Redemption, in

STRUCTURING REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS IN THE MIDEIGHTIES: TRANSACTIONS IN TRANSITION 497-98 (A.B.A. 1985); Preble & Cartwright, Convert-

ible and Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclogging The Equity Of Redemption, 20
PROP. PROB.

& TR. J. 821, 825 (1985).
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uity courts to prevent forfeitures by borrowers whose mortgage instruments contained clauses that indefeasibly vested title to their
property in the mortgagee, if payment of the indebtedness was
even one day later than required.3 The doctrine, which denied specific performance of such clauses, was a necessary corollary to the
very concept of an equity of redemption (the right in equity of a
mortgagor in default to buy back the property by paying the
debt).4 Thus, agreements found in a mortgage instrument or executed contemporaneously with a mortgage, that purported to waive
the mortgagor's right to redeem or that had the equivalent effect,
were uniformly held to be void in equity. 5
Undoubtedly, the rule was an innovative and highly enlightened development in seventeenth century jurisprudence. However,
in England, the rule was often broadly stated and, therefore, seemingly invalidated any benefit granted to a secured lender other
than interest." American courts have generally applied the doctrine
to achieve just results. Nonetheless, today the rule casts a cloud of
uncertainty upon the legal status of innovative mortgage instruments and real estate financing transactions used by the most sophisticated institutions and developers.
This article examines the clogging doctrine's present contours
and its potential impact upon modern real estate financing techniques in light of the rule's historical and ethical underpinnings.
First, modern financing techniques will be briefly surveyed. Second, the policies underlying the clogging rule will be examined in
their historical context, one in which usury laws were strict, the
law of unconscionability was in its infancy, and mortgaged lending
was predominantly the domain of unregulated individuals. Third,
the present viability of the doctrine will be considered in view of
the relaxation of usury laws, the development of UCC unconscionability concepts, and the dominant modern role of large institutional mortgage lenders.' Finally, some practical approaches and
proposed solutions to the problems created by the rule will be
discussed.
' See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.59 (1952).
4Id.

6

See 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1193 (5th ed. 1941).
See, e.g., Jennings v. Ward, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705).
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OF ALTERNATIVE REAL ESTATE FINANCING

TECHNIQUES

During the past twenty years, as a result of increasing disillusionment with fixed-rate, long-term mortgages, financial institutions that have traditionally served as sources of so called "permanent" financing for residential and commercial real estate developments have resorted to more creative financing transactions. In
general terms, the cause of this dissatisfaction has been the low
rate of inflation adjusted return provided by mortgages during this
period.7 Consequently, substantial growth has taken place in the
use of alternative real estate financing techniques.
A variety of additional factors has heightened the pressure
upon these institutions-primarily banks, savings and loan associations, and life insurance companies-to generate alternative real
estate investment vehicles.8 For banks and savings and loan associations, the major additional pressure has been generated by
portfolio lag, the inability of income from past long-term investments to cover the higher costs of money obtained at prevailing
higher rates.
Life insurance companies have suffered from related pressures.
Cash outflows from policy loans and a trend toward the purchase
of term insurance rather than whole life policies have put life insurers in a position analogous to the bankers. The need to charge
competitive term life premiums, like the banks' need to pay market rates to attract deposits, furnishes a strong motivation to find
7

For example, one article cites a Brookings Institute study indicating that CPI-ad-

justed interest actually earned on fixed rate, long-term mortgages declined from an average
of 3.51 percent on loans made in the 1950's, to an average of 2.15 percent on loans made
during the 1960's, to an average real return of 1.73 percent during the years 1970 through
1975. This occurred despite the dramatic rise in contract interest rates that occurred for
these same instruments during the same time period: From 5.02 percent for loans made
between 1951 and 1959, to 6.58 percent for loans made in the 1960's, to 9.34 percent for
loans made from 1970 through 1975. Strum, Long Term Fixed Rate Mortgages, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80's 23 (A.B.A. 1981); See generally, Strum,
The Roles of Life Insurance Companies and Pension Funds in FinancingReal Estate in
the 80's, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80'S 1 (A.B.A. 1981). Of
course, the high real interest rates and relatively low inflation rates that have typified the
1980's, so far, belies the notion that fixed rate, long-term loans are no longer good investments. Rather, it serves to illustrate that long-term lenders have historically borne the risk
of inflation. And, as the apparent risk has increased, prudent lenders have naturally sought
alternatives.
8 See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments and the Institutional
Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained,39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 579 (1971) [hereinafter Roegge].
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higher yielding investments than the traditional fixed return
mortgage.'
The increasing importance of pension fund money managed by
financial institutions further heightens the pressure for alternative
financing transactions. ERISA's diversification requirements and
fiduciary standards are widely believed to open the door to the investment of some of these funds in real estate. 10 Considering the
o Id. at 583-85.
10

See ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982). Section 404(a)(1) provides

that*
Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1334 of this title, a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive pqrpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar
as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter or subchapter III of this chapter.
Id. Subparagraph (B)'s "prudent man" language is widely believed to create a reasonable
expert standard. Read in conjunction with Subparagraph (C)'s diversification requirement,
some have speculated that while real estate investments are certainly not a mandatory component of a pension fund investment portfolio, a prudent plan administrator would at least
consider the possibility of some real estate investment. See Strum, supra note 7, at 3. The
argument may be paraphrased as follows: A plan administrator is explicitly required by 29
U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(C) to diversify for the purpose of reducing risk of large losses. Real
estate investments are an even older and more traditional method of preserving wealth than
the typical corporate debt and equity securities that form the bulk of the normal trust portfolio. Therefore, a prudent expert investor would naturally diversify some of his funds into
some sort of real estate investment. See Strum, supra note 7, at 3. This argument is bolstered by ERISA's abandonment of the traditional approved investments list in favor of
Section 404's more general approach. Further, the prudent expert standard seems to preclude the excuse of complexity as a reason for avoiding an investment. See Lanoff, Impact
of ERISA on Commercial Real Estate Investment by Employee Benefit Plans, in PENSION
TRUST INVESTMENTS IN REALTY: BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, WALL STREET, DEVELOPERS

275 (P.L.I. 1981). See also McMahan, Institutional Strategiesfor Real Estate Equity Investment, in PENSION TRUST INVESTMENTS IN REALTY: BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, WALL
STREET, DEVELOPERS 107 (P.L.I. 1981). However, there is another side. The sheer size of
required investments may make direct equity investments in real estate highly imprudent
for a small plan. Id. at 116. Similarly, the inherent uncertainty of appraisal as a method of
valuation, combined with the illiquidity that makes reliance upon appraisal frequently necessary, can detract from the attractiveness of a real estate investment. A pooled investment
vehicle may mitigate these drawbacks.
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inflationary history of the economy, and the particular objectives
of most pension plans, such investments may well be part of a wise
strategy quite apart from legal considerations of diversification.
Pension plan benefits are typically defined in terms of the employees' salaries during the five years prior to career termination. Thus,
effective hedging against inflation is critically important.1 1
While, with the exception of the very recent past, inflation adjusted yields on mortgages have been falling since the 1950's,12 real
estate property values have risen in real terms. Therefore, it is not
surprising that traditional mortgage lenders have sought avenues
for sharing in the inflation hedge and profit opportunities inhering
to the equity side of real estate investment, as well as seeking to
limit the risk of inflation-adjusted losses on fixed rate long-term
loans.
In retail residential financing, the industry response has been
to develop a variety of "alternative mortgage instruments." These
are designed to meet two objectives. Some permit a more rapid response to changes in prevailing interest rates-by shortening the
term of the loan, insertion of due-on-sale or due-on-encumbrance
clauses, or actual indexing of interest rates. Other instruments, for
example, Shared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMS), allow the
" See Strum, supra note 7, at 5. See also The Recession Proof Boom, in The Economist, February 7, 1981, reprintedin PENSION TRUST INVESTMENTS INREALTY: BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, WALL STREET, DEVELOPERS 141, 145 (P.L.I. 1981). One paradoxical effect of
inflation is to invert some traditional notions of investment safety. A "high quality" fixed
interest debt instrument may be a low risk in terms of the debtor's creditworthiness, but if
it is a long term indebtedness, it offers scant protection against inflation rates with no theoretical upper limit. In contrast, an investment in commercial real estate, although potentially at real risk to normal business cycles, can offer significant inflation protection through
the use of indexed rent adjustment formulae or short lease terms. This apparent risk inversion is of particular concern to the pension fund. Since a fund's liabilities are usually linked
to future wages, they are real (i.e., effectively inflation indexed) liabilities and potentially
unlimited in dollar amount. This is always a matter of relatively immediate concern to fund
managers since any actuarial shortfalls in funding may trigger a requirement of additional
contributions by plan sponsors under ERISA. See ERISA § 302(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1082
(a)(b) (1982). See also Strum, Pension Fund Investments in Real Estate, in PENSION FUND
INVESTMENTS IN REALTY: BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, WALL STREET, DEVELOPERS 21, 31

(P.L.I. 1981). Further, this need to maintain adequate actuarial funding creates yet another
concern for fund managers, since economic factors such as fluctuating interest rates will
affect the market value of portfolio investment. It has been suggested that an appropriate
commitment of investment funds to real estate may serve to reduce this undesirable volatility. See Weisz, Investment Strategies and the Common Trust Fund, in PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS IN REALTY: BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, WALL STREET, DEVELOPERS 59, 64

(P.L.I. 1981).
12 See supra note 7.
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lender to share in the appreciation of the mortgaged property."3
On the commercial side, the industry response has been the
rise of the large real estate joint venture. These transactions have
been as diverse as the legal, financial and tax requirements of the
13 SAMs (Shared Appreciation Mortgages) are a class of loan instruments sharing several distinguishing elements: (1) a fixed rate of interest that is generally lower than the
prevailing rate for a conventional mortgage; (2) a contingent interest provision that permits
the lender to share in the appreciation of the property by charging interest equal to a portion of the increase in value of the property, at set time intervals or upon maturity of the
note; (3) acceleration of the note upon sale, encumbrance or refinancing. Depending upon
the particular instrument, the contingent interest charge may be based on periodic (e.g.,
every five years) appraisals of the property throughout the life of a loan that is amortized
over a long time period, or, alternatively, the interest may accrue only upon maturity of the
note. If the interest accrues only upon maturity, the loan will typically have a short term
(e.g., no more than 10 years) but payments will be amortized over a longer time period (e.g.,
30-40 years). In the latter situation, a guaranteed refinancing provision may be part of the
contract. In the periodic reappraisal type of SAM, provision may be made to amortize the
contingent interest that accrues, either through a separate note or as part of the original
instrument.
In a commercial setting, a SAM may be utilized to allocate one of the major benefits of
equity ownership-the potential appreciation of the property-to the mortgagee. In a residential context, proponents advocate SAMs as a means of providing first-time home buyers
with access to affordable financing.
A variety of legal pitfalls surround the design of these instruments. Potential problems
include usury limits, unconscionability, arguable foreclosure problems (due to the uncertain
status of the mortgagee), priority issues as to the lien securing the contingent interest, as
well as the major focus of the discussion-clogging the equity of redemption. See Levin &
Roberts, Future Forms of Financing-LendingDevices Addressed to Inflation and Tight

Money, in FINANCING

REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY

80's 31 (A.B.A. 1981) [herein-

after Levin & Roberts] (overview of alternative mortgage instruments); Comment, The
Shared Appreciation Mortgage: A Clog on the Equity of Redemption, 15 J. MAR. L. REv.
131, 150-54 (1982) (discussion of SAMs and clogging). A detailed treatment of the characteristics of the mortgage instruments primarily designed for borrowers with expectations of
rising incomes (or a short period of ownership of the property) may be found in Levin &
Roberts, supra. The instruments and programs treated by the authors include the Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM), the Deferred Interest Mortgage (DIM), the Flexible Loan
Insurance Program (FLIP) and the Tenants in Common Keeping Equity Plan (TICKET).
Id. at 35-40. The simplest of these arrangements is the GPM, which couples a fixed interest
rate loan to an individualized payment plan that may include negative amortization in the
early years (when payments are low). DIMs are GPM variants-a portion of the interest
charges for the first two years of the loan term are deferred and added to the outstanding
balance. Id. The FLIP concept requires the borrower to deposit what might have been a
down payment in an interest bearing account. The lender then furnishes what amounts to a
GPM for the entire purchase price of the borrower's home. A schedule of deductions from
the interest bearing account serves to reduce the early loan payments, until the account is
exhausted. Id. at 39. The TICKET plan pairs a borrower who cannot obtain funds for a
down payment with an investor who furnishes those funds in return for an undivided interest in the property as tenant in common. The borrower and investor agree to sell or refinance within five years, at which time the investor presumably takes his profit. Id. Variable
rate mortgages (yet another "alternative mortgage" instrument) are discussed infra at note
151.
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lenders and developers involved.14 However, these transactions are
distinguishable as a class by provision for an equity participation
by the institutional lender. Participation by an institutional lender
generally involves either an interest in the venture or in the underlying property dating from the inception of the deal or the completion of some phase of construction, options to acquire an interest
at a later date, or both."6 Thus, for example, a convertible mortgage may be employed as a component of a joint venture agreement. The convertible mortgage couples a mortgage loan with an
option in favor of the mortgagee to purchase all or a portion of the
secured property or the venture equity at some future date.
A common thread running through most modern real estate
financing techniques is the grant of some additional benefit to the
mortgage lender on top of interest. This additional interest to the
institutional lender creates a potential conflict with an ancient rule
that was originally directed at the excesses of unscrupulous individual lenders. This rule is the doctrine forbidding clogs on the
16
equity of redemption.

III.

HISTORICAL SETTING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CLOGGING DOCTRINE

The origin of the rule against clogging is found in the evolution of the mortgage itself. In the fourteenth century, mortgages
took the form of a conveyance of the mortgaged property to the
See Roegge, supra note 8, at 588-89, 636-39.
,5 A good illustration of the potential for diversity is found in an outline of some of the
basic deal structures used by institutional investors, in Furnary & Simpson, Real Estate
Investments for Pension Funds, in PENSION TRUST INVESTMENTS IN REALTY: BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, WALL STREET, DEVELOPERS 73, 78-81 (P.L.I. 1981). As the authors indicate,
the size of the institution's commitment may be to fund the gap between permanent financing and total project cost, or to fund the entire project. The leverage (and, consequently, the
risk appreciation potential, and depreciation-related tax benefits) afforded to the developer
may vary from little, or none in the case of a free and clear equity investment by the institutional investor, to the maximal leverage achieved in a land sale/leaseback with a leasehold
mortgage. In this latter deal structure, the institutional investor purchases the land from
and leases it back to the developer. The construction is then financed by a leasehold mortgage on the improvement, permitting the lender to foreclose on the entire interest of the
developer in case of default on either rent or mortgage payments. The nature of the institution's interest may also be that of a traditional mortgagor, or hybridized through the use of
a SAM, see supra note 13, or a convertible mortgage.
1" The doctrine is generally said to date back at least to 1639. See Norstrand, The
Convertible Mortgage and the Equity of Redemption, 26 B.B.J. 24, 25 (Sept. 1982). See
also Bacon v. Bacon, 21 Eng. Rep. 146 (1639) (court relieved mortgage to the tenth generation even though purchaser did not have notice). But see supra note 2.
14
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mortgagee subject to a condition subsequent. The condition subsequent, also known as a defeasance, provided that title would revert
to the grantor if the grantor paid the indebtedness by the law
date. If timely full payment was not made, the mortgagor lost his
property. These conveyances were enforceable at common law.
Considerable injustice could result, however, since the value of the
forfeited land could be grossly disproportionate to the outstanding
indebtedness.

7

In the 1600's, equity courts began granting relief to defaulting
mortgagors by holding that an equity of redemption arose upon
default that gave the mortgagor the right to buy back the property
by paying the indebtedness. This right inhered in the mortgagor
notwithstanding the language of the instrument.' 8 Lenders were
quick to react by inserting waivers of the equity of redemption in
the mortgage instruments. These waivers, however, were uniformly
invalidated in equity on the theory that the equity of redemption
could not be clogged by a contractual term. 19 From this beginning,
the equity courts continued to make it utterly clear that the mortgagor's right to redeem after default could not be contracted
away. 20 This principle is often phrased "once a mortgage always a
mortgage"21 even though, from a logical standpoint, the invalidation of a contractual clause that waives the equity of redemption is
in some respects more akin to making a mortgage out of that which
never was a mortgage.
The doctrine might have been easy to live with, were it not for
the related doctrine that forbade mortgagees from taking collateral
advantages which crept into the doctrines of equity in the eighteenth century. In its broadest form, the rule was phrased: "A man
shall not have interest for his money on a mortgage, and a collateral advantage besides for the loan of it; or clog the equity redemption with any by-agreement...
One might conclude that the collateral advantage doctrine, as
thus stated, is an entirely separate principle from that of clogging
rather than a particular sub-genre of the general category of clogs.
'7

G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 6 (1951).

:8 Id.

Id. at § 97.
Id.
21 Id.
20

22

Jennings v. Ward, 23 Eng. Rep. 935, 935 (1705).
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Unfortunately, the reporter in Jennings v. Ward2 chose to use the
conjunction "or" in the language quoted above, which permits both
interpretations.24 From a grammatical standpoint, the leading British case of Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage
Co.,25 discussed infra, could be said to stand for the proposition
that the word "or" in Jennings should be read to mean "to wit."
Therefore, a collateral advantage cannot be bad unless it also satisfies the definition of a clog on equity of redemption. Practitioners
might rightly sigh in relief at this ruling, since if one were to read
the conjunction to denote alternative doctrines, virtually all modern real estate financing would be suspect.
Even assuming that the collateral advantage doctrine was a
separate restriction on mortgages from the clogging doctrine, it is
not clear whether a collateral advantage that did not result in a
total benefit to the mortgagee in excess of the usury limit would be
proscribed. 26 However, the collateral advantage doctrine does not
appear to be a factor in American cases, and, in any event, "the
modern rule" is more clearly directed towards invalidating contractual clauses that prevent a mortgagor from redeeming after default. Nevertheless, room for disagreement exists as to what does
or does not prevent redemption. The focal point of this argument
today concerns the mortgagee's option to purchase real property
securing the indebtedness. These options are integral parts of convertible mortgages, and are found as well as components of a variety of deal structures. The theory for invalidating the mortgagee's
option is that if the mortgagee acquires an ownership interest in
the mortgaged property (by exercising the option) the mortgagor
could not possibly redeem. Convertible mortgages and options to
purchase an interest in the secured property can provide the institutional lender with some of the long term benefits of a joint venture, while avoiding the duties and liabilities of partnership until
exercise. The developer in a joint venture may find the option or
23

Id.

, See generally 30 WORDS AND PHRASES 100-108, 135-137 (West 1972) and cases cited
therein (illustrations of the word's versatility).
21 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) 802 (1914).
26 See, e.g., infra note 43.
27 See Nellis and Hastie, Real Estate Joint Ventures in the 80"s, in FINANCING REAL
ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80's, 201, 206 (A.B.A. 1981) (summary of serious poten-

tial legal problems associated with convertible mortgage). Problems associated with convertible mortgages include usury, clogging the equity of redemption, sufficiency as a tax tool,
and the uncertain availability of specific performance of an option to purchase an interest in
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the convertible mortgage to be a useful device for limiting the
amount of pre-construction capital contributions by the co-venturers. This may help the developer to avoid the unfavorable tax consequences of being classified as a partner whose equity contribution is services.2 8 By delaying the acquisition of an equity interest
by the long term lender, the device may also serve to shift the tax
benefits of early year losses to the venturer most able to utilize
them, who is generally the developer. Of course, an option to buy
an interest in a development after completion of construction can
also be attractive in more straightforward terms-as a mechanism
for allocating the entrepreneurial risks in the early phases of a construction project, or as a bargained-for "sweetener" to induce more
favorable mortgage terms.20
Considering the utility of mortgagees' options in real estate finance, the clogging rule's effect upon their enforceability would be
reason enough to be troubled. However, the logic underlying the
clogging rule is quite open-ended. As a result, the rule casts a cloud
of uncertainty over far more than the mortgagee's option and the
convertible mortgage. It led Lord Mersey to observe, in Kreglinger
v. New PatagoniaMeat & Cold Storage Co.,30 that the rule was
"like an unruly dog, which, if not securely chained to its own kennel, is prone to wander into places where it ought not to be."'"
Modern finance techniques further the societal goal of making
mortgage money more available to borrowers. Yet, the clogging
rule seemingly operates to frustrate this purpose. This is an odd
consequence to flow from a doctrine designed to protect borrowers.
A necessary conclusion, therefore, is that either the rule has outgrown its original purpose or the world of modern finance has outa partnership. Id.
28

To the extent permissible under section 704(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26

U.S.C. § 704(a)(1982), a developer will generally wish to maximize its own allocation of income in the partnership agreement, and minimize third-party contributions of capital, until
contributing property of substantial value to the venture (typically, upon completion of a
phase of construction). This will make it less likely that the third-party capital contributions will appear to be partial payment for the services contributed by the developer. If the
developer is found to be a partner for services, its tax status will be unfortunate-the partnership interest will be recognized as immediate ordinary income, without generating any
cash for payment of the resulting tax liability. See Abramson, Tax Tools for Structuring
Real Estate Investments in the Inflationary 80's, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE
INFLATIONARY 80's, 291, 294 (A.B.A. 1981).
29 Nellis and Hastie, supra note 27, at 206.
30 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) 802 (1914)(Mersey, Lord, concurring).
31 Id. at 808 (Mersey, Lord, concurring).
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grown the rule.32 An examination of the leading British and American cases will demonstrate, at minimum, that Lord Mersey's
unruly dog has been wandering quite a bit.

IV.

THE LEADING CASES

A. British Cases
It is generally agreed that the leading modern British case on
the clogging doctrine is Kreglinger v. New PatagoniaMeat & Cold
Storage Co. 33 In Kreglinger, a firm of meat canners borrowed
10,000 pounds for a five year term at six percent interest, secured
by a floating charge on "its undertaking, and all its property both
present and future." 34 As part of the agreement, the company
granted the secured parties, who were woolbrokers, a right of first
refusal on all sheepskins they sold for five years, and promised to
pay a one percent commission on any skins sold to others. The
borrowers prepaid the loan but resisted enforcement of the "option." They argued that determining whom they did business with
was an incident of ownership of their business. To allow a claim on
this property right to outlive the debt clogged their right of redemption.3 5 The House of Lords rejected the "clogging" argument.
The court viewed the option as a separate and reasonable contract
in substance despite its location in the loan agreement.3 6 The
Kreglinger court's decision is helpful, therefore, in that it makes
clear that the form of an agreement will not control the result in a
particular case.37 The opinion offers little guidance, however, as to
what in substance constitutes a clog on the equity of redemption. 8
" In this regard, it is worth noting that the typical modern mortgage lender is a large
institution with a broad range of accountabilities that serve to motivate responsible behavior. Yet, as recently as the 1920's, most mortgagees were largely unregulated individuals. See
Kratovil, Mortgage Law Today, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 251, 251-52. (1980).
33 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) 802 (1914).
34 Id. at

803.

Id. at 803-04.
36 Id. at 807, 808. In view of the fact that the woolbroker-lenders had a legitimate business interest in obtaining the skins, the transaction could reasonably be viewed as one
whose primary purpose was to obtain a supply of sheepskins. However, the meat canners
could argue with equal force that as far as they were concerned, the primary purpose of the
deal was to obtain a loan. Here, the court might have reasonably concluded that the parties
had different primary intents in entering into the contract. Perhaps this is part of the reason that the court found two separate contracts in one instrument. Id. at 807-08.
37 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at § 16.58.
" We can be certain, at least, that any agreement by a mortgagor that directly deprives
him of the right to redeem, or places time limits on redemption, or otherwise expressly
'"
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The cases preceding Kreglinger shed some light on the nature of
this confusion.
In Jennings v. Ward, 39 defendant lent 16,000 pounds secured
by a mortgage and a covenant to convey so much of the mortgaged
estate as would equal the value of the indebtedness. Redemption
was granted and the convenant invalidated:
[B]ut the Master of the Rolls decreed a redemption, on payment
of principal, interest and costs, without regard to that agreement;
but set aside the same as unconscionable. A man shall not have
interest for his money, and a collateral advantage besides for the
loan of it, or clog the redemption with any by-agreement. 40
Thus was born the so-called collateral advantage corollary of the
clogging rule.
On its facts, Jennings would seem to be merely another case
in which a covenant was invalidated because it would have made a
mortgage irredeemable if enforced. However, undoubtedly due to
the breadth of the language of the report, Jennings is cited for the
proposition that any benefit given to a mortgagee in addition to
interest is a collateral advantage and is, therefore, void.41
English courts retrospectively have interpreted the case as an
42
effort by the equity courts to prevent evasion of the usury laws.
Thus, in 1889, the Chancery Division concluded that the Jennings
collateral advantage doctrine had no viability since the repeal of
the usury laws, at least when the parties had equal bargaining
power.4 3 Apparently, the collateral advantage, which once was bad
limits the right, is absolutely void. See, e.g., Price v. Perrie, 22 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1195 (1702)
(mortgagee's option to buy equity of redemption after default is void); Howard v. Harris, 23
Eng. Rep. 406, 408 (1683) (mortgagor cannot restrict redemption to male heirs of his body);
Jason v. Eyres, 22 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1065 (1681) (cannot forfeit redemption right on mortgagee's death); Newcombe v. Bonham, 22 Eng. Rep. 1063, 1064 (1681) (express waiver of redemption right is void). If the substance of a transaction is the creation of security, substance will win out over form. See Salt v. Northampton, 65 L.T.R. 765 (1892); Courtenay v.
Wright, 66 Eng. Rep. 141, 147 (1860); Vernon v. Bethel, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762).
39 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705).
40 Id.
41 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, §16.60, at 111-12.
42 See, e.g., Kreglinger, 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 805.
43 See Mainland v. Upjohn, 41 Ch. D. 126, 136, 144 (1889). But see James v. Kerr, 40
Ch. D. 449, 449-60 (1889), where the court stated that the rule against collateral advantages
had more viability since the repeal of the usury laws, to protect against unfair results where
the parties do not have equal bargaining power. The court in James concluded that even
before the repeal of the usury laws, the doctrine had independent significance. Id. at 460.
However, the supporting citations listed in both the Mainland and the James decisions are
generally equivocal. One exception is French v. Baron, 2 Atk. 120, 26 Eng. Rep. 475 (1740),
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because it was in the nature of extra interest, was on its way to
becoming a respectable part of an arms-length deal.
This evolution continued in Biggs v. Hoddinott.44 There, the
brewer-plaintiff had taken a mortgage on the defendant's hotel. In
return for an extension in the repayment terms, defendant agreed
to serve only the plaintiff's beer for the term of the loan. The court
observed that the provision was in no way oppressive and found it
to be an acceptable collateral advantage. 45 The court also emphasized that Jennings stood only for the proposition that a collateral
advantage should not prevent redemption, and such prevention
was not present in this agreement.46
The clogging doctrine was further narrowed in Santley v.
Wilde,47 where a loan provision was upheld even though it provided for payment of both interest and one third of profits from
rent on a ten year leasehold. The court was not disturbed that this
provision could outlive repayment of the loan. Rather, it implied
that the clogging doctrine was no substitute for usury laws:
Any provision inserted to prevent redemption on payment or performance of the debt or obligation for which the security was
given is what is meant by a clog or fetter on the equity of recited by the James court, James, 40 Ch. D. at 459, for the proposition that the rule against
collateral advantages originated independently of the usury laws. In French, a mortgagor
promised to pay the mortgagee for the mortgagee's expenses of collecting rents, in addition
to interest on the indebtedness. Id., 26 Eng. Rep. at 476. Since the amounts involved and
the interest rate is not reported, one inference might be that the amounts were irrelevant
and that usury was not a factor. Of course, an alternative interpretation could involve difficulties in transcription of the report.
" [1898] 2 Ch.307.
" Id. at 311.
" Id. at 315-16. Was there ever a blanket prohibition of collateral advantages, or was
the purported legal doctrine a result of unfortunate wordsmanship in Jennings? There do
not seem to be any clogging cases in which contractual benefits are struck down solely because they represent non-interest benefits for the use of money. Rather, the issue in the
clogging cases seems reduced to the issue of whether the suspect provision prevents redemption. Labelling the provision as a collateral advantage may be effective advocacy, but the
rule against collateral advantages appears to add nothing of substance to the law. See Biggs
v. Hoddinott, [1898] 2 Ch.307, 317-18, where the court reviewed the progeny of Jennings
and concluded that the rule of Jenningswas at all times an overstatement. In fact, the court
concluded, there is always either a clog on the equity of redemption or some overreaching in
a bad collateral advantage. James, discussed supra note 43, is not contrary to this view.
Interestingly, the Biggs court distinguished French, also discussed supra note 43, as involving a charge that had to be paid in order to redeem the property, rather than a collateral
advantage. See Biggs, [1898] 2 Ch. at 315-16. On this basis, the Biggs court concluded, in
effect, that there are no cases supporting the so-called Jennings v. Ward doctrine. Id. at
315.
"" [1899] 2 Ch.474.
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demption and is therefore void. It follows from this, that "once a
mortgage always a mortgage"; but I do not understand that this
principle involves the further proposition that the amount or nature of the further debt or obligation the payment or performance
of which is to be secured is a clog or fetter within the rule. .. 48
This was a significant development in the growing judicial approval of the collateral advantage, since the provision arguably
prevented redemption for the ten year life of the covenant, and
profits from rent would appear to be incidents of ownership of a
leasehold. In fact, since the covenant lasted for the life of the
leasehold, redemption was effectively impossible.4 9
However, in the subsequent decision of Noakes & Co. v.
Rice,50 we learn of at least one type of obligation that will constitute a clog. Plaintiff was a brewer who mortgaged his brewery and
covenanted to serve the defendant-mortgagee's malt liquor on the
premises exclusively. The covenant was worded by the parties so as
to indicate their intent to create a charge upon the brewery that
would "run with the land" and persist beyond the term of the
debt.5 1 This was held to be unenforceable beyond the term of the
debt as a "fetter" on the brewer's right to redeem.5 2 One may question whether Noakes is consistent with Santley.
Fortunately, Bradley v. Carritt53 obviated this question by
overruling Santley. Here, defendant in a breach of contract action
had pledged his shares in a tea company to the plaintiff and covenanted to forever use the plaintiff as his tea broker. The trade custom was that brokers bought shares to get their business. Defendant paid his debt, sold the shares to another broker and refused to
honor the covenant. The covenant was held invalid because it exceeded the term of the debt. Biggs was distinguished for this

reason.

4

,8 Id. at 474-75.

49 This is a good example of the logical openness of the rule, since this type of analysis
could lead to the conclusion that any leasehold mortgage lasting for the term of the lease
was a clog on the equity of redemption if pre-payment were penalized.
51 [1902] App. Cas. 24, 86 L.T.R. (n.s.) 62 (1902).
81Id. The court expressed considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of this attempt to
bind the brewer's successors in interest by the covenant. Noakes, [1902] App. Cas. at 32, 86
L.T.R. at 64. However, the issue was never reached, as it was not argued on appeal. Id. at
25-26, 86 L.T.R. at 62. Even if the covenant were strictly a personal obligation of the
brewer, it was impliedly void for outliving the debt.
52 Id. at 29-30, 86 L.T.R.
at 64.
13 [1903] App. Cas. 253.
54 Id. See also Fairclough v. Swan Brewery Co., 106 L.T.R. 931 (1912) (covenant which
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One year later, however, in Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood
Paving Corp.,55 an obligation that did not extend beyond the term
of the loan was voided as a clog on the mortgagor's equity of redemption. The contractual provision was an option to buy, at discount, the debenture stock of Jarrah, which had been pledged to
Samuel, the optionee and mortgagee. The option was held to be
void as a clog on Jarrah's right to redeem, emanating from the
principle "once a mortgage always a mortgage. ' 56 The court analyzed the facts in this manner:
The first question is, What is the true nature of this agreement?
Is it a mortgage with an option to purchase, or is it a conditional
sale? Or is it an agreement giving Samuel an option to hold the
debenture stock as a mortgage or a purchase? It appears to me to
be clearly a mortgage with an option to purchase.5"
The court's finding was a mortgage was intended, implicating
the equity of redemption doctrine. Thus, the option was void as an
impairment of a redemption right, and "[a]ny bargain which has
that effect is invalid. .. ,58
Unfortunately, the court did not explain how it differentiated
between a mortgage with an option to purchase and an option to
hold the collateral as either a mortgage or a purchase. It would
seem that these two possibilities are rather similar and probably
only distinguishable by a most subtle inquiry into the intent of the
discharges immediately before leasehold expires makes mortgage irredeemable); Morgan v.
Jeffreys, [1910] 1 Ch.D. 620 (one-sided provisions which make mortgage irredeemable for
twenty-eight years exceed "all reasonable limits" and not enforceable).
5 [1904] App. Cas. 323, 325.
11 Id. at 329. Jarrahillustrates just how unfortunate the phrase "once a mortgage always a mortgage" can be when taken out of its original context. It should mean that an
equity of redemption is inseparably part of every mortgage. This meaning flows naturally
when the principle is used to strike down a time limit on redemption, for example, since
such a provision, if given effect, would change a mortgage into an absolute conveyance. See
4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at § 16.59. However, in Jarrah,the court
invalidated the mortgagee's option on an emanation from this principle. In effect, this is a
different principle entirely. Further, a clause placing time limits on a redemption right may
well take advantage of a borrower's optimism about his ability to repay his debt which is a
basis for the rule. See Wyman, The Clog on the Equity of Redemption, 21 HAv. L. Rav.
459, 460, 475 (1908). However, the knowing grantor of an option to buy property cannot
possibly have any hope of realizing more than the option price on sale of the property. Thus,
evolving from the protection of borrower hopes and perhaps their expectations in the earlier
clogging holdings, the court clearly has made a transition in Jarrah toward protecting the
borrower from its own view of a bad bargain.
' Jarrah,[1904] App. Cas. at 328.
58 Id. at 329.
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parties to the arrangement. Nor did it explain how any obligation
in addition to interest could help but impair the right of redemption, if the borrower had difficulty meeting the obligation.
Kreglinger clarified matters somewhat by holding that Jennings'
notion, that all collateral advantages were bad, was simply obsolete
considering the repeal of the English usury laws in 1854.59 Thus,
the only bad collateral advantages were those that were unconscionable and those that penalized or prevented the borrower from
exercising a redemption right.6 0
However, the question remained: What type of collateral advantage interferes with the exercise of a redemption right? By endorsing Jarrah,Lord Parker's opinion in Kreglinger suggests that,
at least when the option is for purchase at less than fair market
value, an option to purchase the security is certainly a bad collateral advantage. Also, he accepted the result in Noakes, indicating
that an exclusive obligation to serve the mortgagee's liquors was
too much of an infringement upon the mortgagor's rights as a proprietor, after redeeming his premises.' Since Lord Parker rejects
the notion that Noakes should turn on the persistence of the "tie"
past the debt, the rule must be that a mortgagee's right of first
refusal is acceptable based on the facts of Kreglinger, but an exclu62
sive dealing agreement is beyond the pale.
Despite some language in Kreglinger suggesting that the rule
against clogging has no place in an ordinary business transaction, 3

'1 Kreglinger, 109
0 Id. at 813.

L.T.R. (n.s) at 811.

" Id. at 812.
This leaves two theoretical possibilities for distinguishing the "tie" in Noakes from
the right of refusal in Kreglinger. First, a "tie" is a far more serious infringement upon an
incident of ownership than a right of refusal, since a "tie" affects the mortgagor's daily use
of the mortgaged property or the business enterprise. Second, the granting of a "tie" involves an arguably measurable loss to the grantor, since the value of the grantor's ownership
interest is seemingly diminished. However, the granting of a right of refusal neither diminishes the value of the enterprise, nor does it impair freedom of action as seriously as a "tie".
Either of these theoretical approaches would consistently explain the result in Jarrah,
since an option to purchase part of the collateral at a set price involves both a serious
dimunition in the value of the grantor's incidents of ownership, and a potential loss in control of the collateral if the option is exercised. It is unfortunate that these two theoretical
possibilities have not been more clearly distinguished in the case law, since the option to
purchase at market value would seem to straddle the theories involving, on the one hand, a
potential loss of control of the subject property, but entailing, by definition, no measurable
decrease in the value of the optionor's interest.
13 For example, the Lord Chancellor stated that the rule should not apply if the right of
first refusal is not part of the mortgage, but rather a separate agreement in substance. But
how did he conclude that there was a separate contract? "If there had been no mortgage
02
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the subsequent English case of Lewis v. Frank Love, Ltd.6 4 indicates otherwise. In Lewis, plaintiff owned a tract of residential
land that was subject to a 6000 pound mortgage. He apparently
was having difficulty meeting the obligation. When his creditors
obtained a judgment on the note, he contacted a knowledgeable
friend for some advice. Together, they decided to seek some interim financing in order to buy time. They apparently planned to
use this time to convince the local authorities to remove certain
restrictions on the use of their property, thereby increasing both
the resale value and development potential. The defendant then
agreed to pay off Lewis' creditors in exchange for a mortgage
granting a two year option to buy a portion of the tract. In return,
Lewis obtained defendant's promise not to demand payment of the
note for an equivalent time period.
The deal deliberately was structured to avoid the clogging doctrine's reach by drafting separate instruments for the mortgage
transfer and the grant of the option. Additionally, the defendant
attempted to assume the role of transferee of a preexisting mortgage rather than a mortgagee. Despite this careful planning, the
court focused on the substance of the deal and refused to enforce
the option. Ironically, the court relied on the correspondence between the attorneys that expressed concern about avoiding the effects of the rule.6 5
Thus, the Lewis court's invalidation of this option is particusuch a contract.., would have been an ordinary incident in such a business." Kreglinger,
109 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 806. Similarly, Lord Parker concluded his opinion with language suggesting that, although the rule still prevented mortgagees from contracting away their redemption rights, the court might well find something other than a mortgage in a business
transaction, thereby circumventing the rule:
I doubt whether, even before the repeal of the usury laws, this perfectly fair and
businesslike transaction would have been considered a mortgage within any equitable rule or maxim relating to mortgages. It never was intended by the parties
that if the defendant company exercised their right to pay off the loan they should
get rid of the option.
Id. at 813. Interestingly, Lord Parker couched his opinion in terms of effectuating the parties' intent. He seemed to be saying that if the parties intend to clog the equity of redemption, then the court should not find a mortgage. The implication is that if a legitimate business deal is involved, the rule will not apply.
.4 [1961] 1 W.L.R. 261.
85 The attorneys may well have acted in such a manner based upon Lord Chancellor's
opinion in Kreglinger:"Icannot but think that the validity of the bargain in such cases as
Bradley v.Carrittand Santley v. Wilde might have been made free from serious question if
the parties had chosen to seek what would have been substantially the same result in a
different form." Kreglinger, 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 807. However, the opinion of the Lewis
court conspicuously failed to even mention Kreglinger.
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larly important since there were no obvious elements of unconscionability66 and the entire transaction was proposed by the
mortgagor.
B. American Cases
The situation is no less confusing in the United States. For
example, in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr,6 7 plaintiff, Humble, had approached the defendants and offered to assist them in
financing the enlargement of their service station. The deal required the defendants to lease the land and building to Humble for
fifteen years at a monthly rent of $272.30. Defendants then were
able to obtain a $35,000 construction mortgage from a bank by assigning the lease as additional security. This mortgage subsequently was converted into a fifteen year "permanent" mortgage
loan with monthly payments of $272.30. The final part of the
transaction involved Humble leasing the station back to defendants, in a year to year lease, also for $272.30 per month. Thus, if
the defendant-borrowers defaulted on the mortgage loan, the bank
could foreclose on its security interest in the lease and look to
Humble's rent payments to satisfy the mortgage debt since the
term and monthly payments for mortgage and lease were identical.
Further, since the monthly leaseback rent was for the same
amount as the mortgage payments and rent under the lease to
Humble, the practical import of this arrangement is much like that
of a guarantee. Humble's credit is engaged, but in the absence of a
default there is no net cash flow between Humble and the other
parties. The result appeared to be a good deal for the defendants
since, as a result of Humble's quasi-guarantee, they obtained more
construction financing than they otherwise might have obtained on
their own.
However, Humble also obtained an option to purchase the fee
interest for $150,000 during the lifetime of the lease which it chose
"6 The court did note one apparent element of unfairness in Lewis in that the plaintiff
had sought a loan of 6,500 pounds, not 6,000 pounds, and clearly needed the additional sum
to prepare his proposal for the town authorities. This sum was orally promised, but never
paid. Lewis, [1961] 1 W.L.R. at 263, 265. Had the court grounded its ruling upon defendant's failure to perform, the case would be comprehensible as a variant of the unclean hands
doctrine. But the court took pains to note that this occurrence merely established that
plaintiff was not necessarily acting in bad faith by resisting the option. See Lewis, [1961] 1
W.L.R. at 267.
'" 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973).
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to exercise ten years later. The value of the land was found to be
$240,000 at this time, compared to $85,000 when the option was
granted. 8
The Humble court held that the option was a clog on the defendant's equity of redemption. It observed that the option would
have been enforceable but for the fact that it "was given in connec' The court had little difficulty
tion with a mortgage loan." 69
in concluding that the lease-leaseback transaction was in substance a
mortgage. Unable to ascertain Humble's motives, the court maintained that the intent of both parties was to create a mortgage.
The evidence considered was largely the substance of the transaction. Thus, Humble was not an ordinary guarantor, but, effectively,
a secured guarantor. More importantly, though, Humble apparently had approached the defendants and presented the deal as a
financing arrangement.
Having completed this small logical leap, the court then relied
70
on Pomeroy's "classic statement of the rule":
Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage; Collateral Agreements
and Agreements Clogging the Equity of Redemption.-In general, all persons able to contract are permitted to determine and
control their own legal relations by any agreements which are not
illegal, or opposed to good morals or to public policy; but the
mortgage forms a marked exception to this principle. The doctrine has been firmly established from an early day that when the
character of a mortgage has attached at the commencement of the
transaction, so that the instrument, whatever be its form, is regarded in equity as a mortgage, that character of mortgage must
and will always continue. If the instrument is in its essence a
mortgage, the parties cannot by any stipulations, however express
and positive, render it anything but a mortgage, or deprive it of
the essential attributes belonging to a mortgage in equity. The
debtor or mortgagor cannot, in the inception of the instrument, as
a part of or collateral to its execution, in any manner deprive
himself of his equitable right to come in after a default in paying
the money at the stipulated time, and to pay the debt and inter'sId. at 543, 303 A.2d at 904. These valuations were made by Humble's expert witness
and accepted by the court. Id. Since Humble was denied both specific performance and
damages by the ruling, the precise figures were not terribly crucial. However, considering
the nature of the appraisal process, it is worth observing that a high appraised value at time
of exercise of the option or a low appraisal at the time of the grant of the option could make
a bargain of this sort look far harsher than it really is.
'9 Id. at 544, 303 A.2d at 905.
o Id. at 544-45, 303 A.2d at 905.
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est, and thereby to redeem the land from the lien and encumbrance of the mortgage; the equitable right of redemption, after a
default is preserved, remains in full force, and will be protected
and enforced by a court of equity, no matter what stipulations the
parties may have made in the original transaction purporting to
cut off this right.7 1
The clogging holding in Humble then was bolstered by that
court's determination that the option was unenforceable as part of
an "unfair, inequitable and oppressive" transaction. 72 A fair transaction apparently would have granted the defendants a fifteen year
sublease. Notably, both the clogging and unfair transaction holdings hinged on a preliminary finding that Humble was a mortgagee.
A situation similar to Humble arose in Cunningham v. Esso
Standard Oil Co.,73 where plaintiff Esso sought and was granted
specific performance of an option to buy a service station. Defendant was assigned an option held by Esso to purchase land for
$8,500 and the defendant put up $2,000 towards exercise of the
option. Esso then arranged $6,500 in third party mortgage financing. In order to finance the construction of a station, Esso leased
the land from defendant for a ten year term with five successive
one year renewal options. Defendant then assigned the lease as security for a mortgage. As in Humble, the lease payments equaled
the mortgage payments and defendant leased the station back on a
year to year basis. Contrary to his attorney's advice, defendant
granted Esso an option to buy the property for $20,000. The land
was worth $18,000 when the agreement was entered but appreciated to $73,000 when Esso exercised its option. The Delaware court
in granting specific performance of the option noted that the deal
was not unconscionable when made, and a subsequent increase in
value does not invalidate this option.7 '
The Humble court distinguished Cunningham because an attorney was present, but it implied that Cunningham would have
71 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at § 1193, quoted in Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Doerr, 123
N.J. Super. at 544-45, 303 A.2d at 905.
71 Humble, 123 N.J. Super. at 559, 303 A.2d at 913. The court also attached importance
to the fact that the option was "not a right of first refusal or one to pay current market
value." Id. at 554, 303 A.2d at 911. But these contractual details were not accorded the
importance attributed to Humble's dominant bargaining position in the transaction.
71 35 Del. Ch. 371, 118 A.2d 611 (1955).
74 Id. at 379, 118 A.2d at 615.
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gone the other way if the clogging issue had been raised. 6 This is a
troublesome implication since the defendant in Cunningham was a
newcomer to the deal and, in some respects, in a position similar to
that of a joint venturer with Esso. Thus, so far, true joint venturers
generally have escaped the clogging rule. 6
MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc.7" came as
close as any American case comes to explicitly holding a joint venture to be exempt from the clogging rule. However, it focused its
decision instead on the purchase money aspects of the transaction.
Nevertheless, the facts of the case lend some support to the notion
that a joint venture should escape the reach of the clogging rule
since the Florida court's conclusions emanated largely from the existence of a larger transaction of which the loan was but a part.
Further, a real estate development joint venture in which mortgage
financing is an integral part of a plan to construct improvements is
akin to a purchase money arrangement to the extent that the financing is secured by "not previously owned" property. Here,
plaintiff MacArthur had sold defendant a large amount of acreage
for development. As part of the same transaction, MacArthur provided construction financing for a water supply and sewer system,
secured by a first mortgage on the land involved. The agreement
also granted plaintiff a five year option to buy the water supply
and sewer system at a price equal to defendant's cost. The court
granted specific performance of the option and rejected the argument that it was a clog on the defendant's equity of redemption:
"This court is committed to the proposition that A can sell a tract
of land to B and reserve an option to re-purchase a part of it."' 8
The court then went on to state that it was illogical to invalidate
this type of transaction merely because A also accommodated B
with a mortgage loan.
The MacArthur court noted that the transaction was conducted at arms length and the buyer was "encumbered" from the
outset. The court indicated that under these circumstances it
75

See Humble, 123 N.J. Super. at 563, 303 A.2d at 915.

76

The author is unaware of any case in which joint venturers have been subjected to

the clogging rule. The court in Humble speculated that different rules may apply to joint
ventures, and cited MacArthur v. N. Palm Beach Util. 202 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1967), as standing for this proposition. Humble, 123 N.J. Super. at 559-60, 303 A.2d at 913-14. However,
although the parties in MacArthur appear to be possibly classifiable as joint venturers, the
MacArthur court did not address this issue.
7 202 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1967).
78 Id.
at 184.
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would be inequitable to give defendant what he never actually
79
had.
Nearly three centuries ago the Jennings court sought to generalize a rule from particular inequitable circumstances, and seemed
to conclude that all collateral advantages were bad. Yet, in MacArthur, the Florida court, applying a similar form of reasoning,
reached a nearly opposite result.
Perhaps, Humble, Cunningham and MacArthur could be rationalized on the basis of the distinction between purchase money
and non-purchase money mortgages. But this rationale fails when
Barr v. Granahan0 is considered. Defendant was a small businessman whose property had gone up in value as a result of his efforts
to build a viable enterprise. Plaintiff was a mortgagee who held an
option to buy the land and building. The option price was fair
when the option was granted, and the mortgage was given to enable the defendant to purchase the property. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that grant of specific performance would not be
equitable under the circumstances."1
What we can glean from these cases is that considerable uncertainty exists as to the enforceability of mortgagee's options.
More generally, some doubt exists as to the enforceability of any
contractual benefit coupled to a mortgage.
V.

THEORIES OF THE CLOGGING DOCTRINE

In Jennings, the court interpreted clogging as a form of "per
se" unconscionability. Yet, the approach utilized by the Barr court,
which examined a mortgagee's option in terms of its unfairness
under the circumstances, seems indistinguishable. The problem is
that the circumstances of Barr are nearly universal. An option
holder only is going to exercise the option if the property value
exceeds the option price. In this circumstance, it is always possible
for a court to find a harsh bargain or forfeiture. Yet, this analysis
would be more sensible if determined at the time the option is
granted. However, as exemplified by the Humble court, some
courts are creative in their search for forfeitures. Clearly then, a
more precise theoretical basis is needed for the clogging rule. Two
approaches are commonly employed: one based on the particular
Id.
80 255 Wis. 192, 38 N.W.2d 705 (1949).
81 Id. at 194, 38 N.W.2d at 706.
70
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property rights involved; the other, concerned with the underlying
policy bases of the rule.
A. Property Based Distinctions: "The Three Rules"
83
Osborne 2 apparently adopted Lord Davey's classification of
the doctrine as encompassing the following three rules: "once a
mortgage, always a mortgage," the rule against collateral advan84
tages, and the rule against fetters.
The first of these rules stands for the proposition that the equitable right of redemption is an inseparable incident of any mortgage. 1 Analytically, this provides a helpful starting point.8 6 If we
can define a mortgage, it should be straightforward enough to proceed to a definition of a redemption right. This was the approach
taken by the court in Batty v. Snook. In Batty, the court concluded that a conditional sales contract executed in connection
with a pre-existing mortgage held by the vendor as mortgagee, coupled with a deed from the contract vendee to the contract vendor,
which purportedly conveyed the property in satisfaction of the
pre-existing mortgage indebtedness, was an equitable mortgage because the deed was intended as security. Therefore, a "time is of
the essence" clause that resulted in a forfeiture was an invalid attempt to deprive the vendee of his equity of redemption:
The mortgagor may release the equity of redemption to the mortgagee for a good and valuable consideration, when done voluntarily, and there is no fraud, and no undue influence brought to
bear upon him for that purpose by the creditor. But it cannot be
done by a cotemporaneous [sic] or subsequent executory contract,
by which the equity of redemption is to be forfeited if the mortgage debt is not paid on the day stated in such contract, without
an abandonment by the court of those equitable principles it has
ever acted on in relieving against penalties and forfeitures.8

82 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 3, at

§ 16.58.

81 See Noakes & Co. v. Rice, [1902] App. Cas. 24. See also 4
ERTY, supra note 3, at § 16.58.
81 See Noakes & Co. v. Rice, [1902] App. Cas. 24.
81 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at

AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-

§ 16.59.
But see supra note 56. This rule was developed to invalidate clauses that waived the
right of redemption, or that attempted to make time of the essence in the exercise of
redemption. Thus, it becomes less helpful as it is applied to indirect clogs on the redemption right.
7 5 Mich. 231, 239-40 (1858).
" Id. at 239-40.
"'
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This reasoning typifies numerous American cases which, when
ascertaining the intent of the parties and finding an intent to secure an indebtedness, have equated any attempt by the lender to
avoid judicial foreclosure or create a forfeiture by the borrower as
an attempt to deprive the borrower of the equity of redemption. s9
The problem with this analysis is that once a mortgage transaction
is found, the remaining logic is inexorable. Since an indebtedness
can only be an obligation to pay money plus interest,90 it necessarily would follow that any other benefit must flow from the equity
of redemption. This logic is worth pondering. Apparently, the
lease-leaseback in Humble fell victim to this logic.
"'See, e.g., In re Ellis, 674 F.2d 1238, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982) (deed with disfeasance
clause a redeemable mortgage); Merryweather v. Pendleton, 91 Ariz. 334, 344, 372 P.2d 335,
340 (1962) (sale of stock with repurchase option intended as mortgage to avoid foreclosure
process); Bowling v. Duff, 272 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Ky. 1954) (deed with leaseback and repurchase option indicates intent of mortgage to secure a debt); Mills v. Reneau, 411 P.2d 516,
519 (Okla. 1965) (mineral deed in separate agreements given as security for debt and intended to be defeasible). See generally 4

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 3, at §

16.59 (discussing cases where intent of parties determined equity redemption rights); cases
cited in 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at § 1193 (intent creates mortgage regardless of form
and stipulations).
90 This notion must have been considered an enlightened restriction on the activities of
moneylenders, who have been viewed with suspicion for thousands of years. See generally
Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAw. 333 (1967) (discussing the
unique combination of history and theology antedating usury laws). Yet it appears extraordinarily rigid when superimposed upon modern notions relating the value of money to the
goods it can buy at the moment, rather than to some absolute standard. This is particularly
true in the context of the institutionalized inflation that has typified much of the economics
of the late twentieth century. The reasons for the apparent rigidity of this idea that indebtedness can only comprise principal plus a fixed rate of interest are also tied up in the modern conception of the time value of money. In the modern framework, interest may be
viewed as having two components. One component is the payment for the use of money in
recognition of the fact that capital is productive. The second component of interest is that
portion of a payment for the use of money that compensates the lender for the erosion of
principal caused by inflation. Underlying these two components of interest are implicit allocations of risk. The borrower assumes the risk of being unable to employ the funds borrowed so as to generate profits above the interest rate. The lender assumes the risk of the
debtor's insolvency. This risk can be reduced if the loan is secured by sufficiently valuable
collateral, although it will obviously remain a substantial risk to the extent that property
values fluctuate. The financial risk represented by the prospect of debtor insolvency may
well pale in comparison to the nearly unlimited risk represented by the prospect of runaway
inflation. See generally P. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMics 598-619 (10th ed. 1976) (discussing reasons why this paradigm is oversimplistic for other purposes). See also Olwine v. Torrens,
236 Pa. Super. 51, 344 A.2d 665 (1975) (risk of dollar depreciating not eliminated by making
loan repayment contingent on relative purchasing power). If creditors could obtain appropriate inflation hedges, a more rational risk allocation for inflationary times could result.
But the idea that an indebtedness should be only an obligation to pay money plus interest
forces the modern financier to work with antiquated tools.
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Therefore, the key inquiry is in determining whether or not a
mortgage exists. The rule is that if the conveyance is intended as
security, an equitable mortgage will be found. If there is any
doubt, the continued existence of a debt will favor the finding of a
mortgage. 91
In this framework, the collateral advantage has its usual
meaning: a benefit given the lender in addition to interest as consideration for the loan. Fetters are a special type of collateral ad92
vantage that outlive the loan.
Unfortunately, a number of cases do not fall neatly into these
analytical categories. In Hopping v. Baldridge,93 the Oklahoma Supreme Court used a clogging rationale to hold that a mortgagee's
ten year option to buy a fifty percent interest in oil and mineral
rights was extinguished when the mortgagor paid off the loan. It is
not clear whether the option would have survived scrutiny in the
absence of prepayment of the loan. A more liberal but equally uncategorizable approach is illustrated by Smith v. Smith,94 in which
the New Hampshire Supreme Court granted specific performance
of a mortgagee's option to buy a house in the event of the mortgagor's death or sale of the premises. The court characterized the
arrangement as a legitimate collateral advantage. However, the
court may have been influenced by the fact that the mortgagee was
the mortgagor's son.
The limited usefulness of the property-based distinction between a good collateral advantage and a clog on the equity of redemption or a "bad collateral advantage" becomes clear when we
try to classify a non-assignable option to repurchase in the hands
95
of an equitable mortgagor. This was the problem in Hill v. Day.
Brown deeded a farm worth $40,000 to Hill for $19,500 in cash,
additional consideration worth $500 and a five year non-assignable
option to repurchase the property for $20,000 plus interest. The
agreement provided that any profits generated by the farm were to
be credited to Brown's option price. Brown sold his interest to
Day, who sought to "redeem" by exercising Brown's option. Since
the profit arrangement was inconsistent with an intention for an
outright sale, the court had no difficulty finding that the Brown91 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, § 1195 at 577.
92 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 16.61 at 112-13.
" 130 Okla. 226, 232, 266 P. 469, 472 (1928).
94 82 N.H. 399, 135 A. 25 (1926).
"' 231 Ark. 550, 331 S.W.2d 38 (1960).
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Hill transaction was an equitable mortgage. This meant that
Brown's option was in fact a redemption right. What, then, becomes of the non-assignability clause? It is void, the court said,
because it has the effect of blocking a redemption right. Apparently, the court was not overly concerned that the non-assignability clause in no way prevented Brown from redeeming his property
directly. Nor was the court concerned that, in substance, it was
holding a non-assignable mortgage to be in violation of the clogging rule. This has been the problem with the post-Jennings ef96
fect-based holdings.
The failure of property theory to delineate and define the
clogging doctrine heightens the importance of policy-based analyses. Several approaches have been suggested.
B. Underlying Policy Supports for the Rule
The most often cited policy basis for the clogging doctrine is
equity's abhorrence of forfeitures.9 7 This is an adequate reason to
invalidate a "time is of the essence" clause, but it is clearly inappropriate when dealing with a mortgagee's option that is a component of a legitimate business deal. Until a non-forfeitable equity of
redemption is found, the mortgagor has no interest to forfeit.
Thus, if an option is granted with an intent to evade foreclosure by
conditioning exercise on the mortgagor's default, finding a forfeiture in the option's exercise protects the legitimate expectations of
the parties. However, when a purchase option is granted to a mortgagee in the context of a fairly bargained commercial transaction,
the mortgagor cannot have a legitimate expectation of an equity of
redemption in the property subject to the option and no forfeiture
should result from the option's exercise.
An eloquent alternative explanation, apparently based on protecting mortgagors from their own overconfidence, was phrased as
follows: "[W]hen duress of circumstance and mistaken self-confidence combine they have won complete recognition in a rigid rule
of nullification, while either of these elements standing alone has
won but partial recognition, in the rule of particular equities."98
96 The problem, simply, is that any burden placed upon the debtor may have the effect
of impeding redemption, although the effect may be remote.
'7 See, e.g., Batty v. Snook, 5 Mich. 231, 240 (1858).
" Note, The Basis of Relief from Penalties and Forfeitures,20 MICH. L. REv. 646, 64849 (1921).
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This is an adequate basis for explaining cases that void attempts
to circumvent foreclosure proceedings, but again fails to justify the
invalidation of a mortgagee's option to purchase when granted in
the context of an arms-length business deal. A mortgagee will exercise the option if there is a significant rise in the value of the property, assuming a fixed and fairly bargained exercise price which is
hardly an unfortunate turn of events for the mortgagor.
A third viewpoint treats the clogging doctrine as an aspect of
enlightened social policy. Thus, an early twentieth century commentator analyzed the rule as protection for the continuing existence of unrestricted alienation rights for property owners.0 9 However, the author failed to recognize that an option is one method of
effecting the alienation of property. The moral overtones lurked
nearby: "[T]o the writer the doctrine against the clog on the equity
of redemption seems one of the striking examples of the great
truth that the ethical standard of our law is often higher than the
average morality of the commercial community."' 10 0 This viewpoint
embraces the property-based distinction upon which the doctrine
is founded and invests it with "righteousness." As an analytical
prediction of case law it is a perfect tautology. However, as a guide
to how the law will be or should be, it has limitations. Undoubtedly, the clogging rule was enlightened policy at the time of its
birth, but with changed financing practices the morality of this
rule discourages the availability of real property mortgages. Thus,
it seems that the primary effect of the clogging rule today is to
introduce uncertainty into the law of mortgages. It would be difficult to establish that the present utility of the rule serves its original purposes.
VI.

CLOGGING, USURY AND UNCONSCIONABILITY

Clearly, the doctrines of usury and unconscionability are
closely related to each other. Both bear a close historical and doctrinal relationship to clogging, as well. In Kreglinger, it was suggested that the clogging doctrine as applied to collateral advantages was a result- of the equity courts' enthusiasm for supple" See Wyman, supra note 56, at 474, where the author states "[aind there is in the eye
of equity a fetter upon his property if the covenant... will, after redemption, hamper [the
owner's enjoyment of the property].. .or hinder him in the disposition of it." Id.
100 Id. at 475.

1986]

EQUITY REDEMPTION

menting the usury laws. 10 1 As will be discussed, the relationship
between unconscionability and clogging is even closer.
A.

Clogging and Usury: The HistoricalLink

The chronology of the English usury laws lends credence to
assertions found in Kreglinger that the rule against collateral advantages was an expression of equity's support for the enforcement
of those statutes. 10 2 The harshness of this disapproval is probably
as significant as the zealousness with which the laws were enforced.
In the middle ages, any charge of interest was considered usury.
Usurers were not only liable to church censure, but their chattels
forfeited to the king and their lands escheated to the lord of the
fee upon death. 10 3 An early English law book even lamented the
fact that usurers were permitted to be buried in sanctuaries.1 0 4
The discovery of the New World either caused or coincided
with a softening of this viewpoint. 0 5 Henry VIII legalized interest
up to ten percent per annum in 1545.106 This statute was repealed,
however, in 1552107 and then reinstated in 1570.108 Complaints
about this high rate'0 9 led to sequential reductions in the maximum rate, to eight percent in 1623,110 then six percent in 1660,111
112
and finally five percent in 1713 by the Statute of Anne.
Maximum legal interest in England remained at five percent
until 1854, when all usury laws were repealed. 113 Dating the birth
10,Kreglinger

v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) 802, 812.

This is not surprising in view of the obvious potential for evasion of usury laws through the
granting of collateral benefits to the lender. But modem courts will place a value on the
benefit and then evaluate whether the total remuneration exceeds usury limits-thus obviating the need for a supplementary doctrine. Cf. Roegge, supra note 8, at 624, where the
authors discuss the problems created by the modern approach.
12 Kreglinger, 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 805.
103 66 C.J.S. Usury § 5 (1934).
,0- See Schlesinger v. State, 195 Wis. 366, 370, 218 N.W. 440, 442 (1928).
101 Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAW. 333, 335 (1967).
106 A Bill Against Usury, 37 Hen. 8, ch. 9 (1545).
007 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 20 (1552).
108 An Act Against Usury, 13 Eliz., ch. 8 (1570).
1 66 C.J.S. Usury § 5 (1934).
110 An Act Against Usury, 21 Jac., ch. 17 (1623).
"I, An Act for the Restraining the Taking of Excessive Usury, 12 Car. 2, ch. 13 (1660).
112 An Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest, Without any Prejudice to Parliamentary
Securities, 12 Anne stat. 2, ch. 16 (1713).
"I An Act to Repeal the Laws Relating to Usury and to the Enrollment of Annuities,
17 & 18 Vict., ch. 90 (1854). For a general overview of the history of usury, see Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 610-16, 34 S.E. 217, 219-20 (1899); Plitt
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of the clogging doctrine at 1639,"14 it is fair to conclude that the
doctrine evolved during a period when the commercial need to permit the charging of interest was vying with public attitudes that
kept a tight lid on permissible rates. By the late nineteenth century, English attitudes had become more accepting of free trade in
money." 5 In that sense, the stage had been set for Kreglinger.
Until recently, the American legal attitude towards high rates
of interest might be best characterized as ambivalent. Thus, in
1933, the North Carolina Supreme Court made its position perfectly clear: "There is nothing more obnoxious than usury. .. "11
However, a New York trial court struggled, in 1905, with the inequity of its own judgment, in awarding principal as well as interest
to plaintiff, under the usury law of the day: "All oppression . . . is
immoral per se . . . but a charge of more than the lawful rate of
interest, where there is no actual oppression, cannot be said to be
11 7
in and of itself immoral."
In the 1980s, it seems clear that interest rates are no longer a
moral issue in the United States. Considering that usury laws are
largely regulatory in the modern view, a realignment of the American clogging doctrine to reflect modern realities seems appropriate.
B. Policy and Theory: Similar Themes for Clogging and Usury
The policies underlying usury laws are almost identical to
those that motivate the clogging doctrine: "There is no need, at
this late date in the law of usury to discuss its rationale. Suffice to
say that its purpose is to protect the necessitous borrower from
extortion." (citations omitted)"'
Further, the factual situations encountered often bear a resemblance to those in which the clogging doctrine has been applied. Thus, in Kawauchi v. Tabata,"9 plaintiff owned property
worth between $300,000 and $400,000. It was sold to defendants
for $90,000 and leased back with a three year repurchase option at
v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 610, 53 A.2d 673, 675 (1947); Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367,
376 (1819).
114 See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at § 16.58.
116 See National Bank of the Commonwealth v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 94 U.S. 437, 438
(1876); Hershman, supra note 105.
116 Dixon v. Osborne, 204 N.C. 480, 486, 168 S.E. 683, 686 (1933).
'1 Hagaman v. Reinach, 48 Misc. 206, 213, 96 N.Y.S. 719, 724 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1905).
Wilcox v. Moore, 354 Mich. 499, 504, 93 N.W.2d 288, 291 (1958).
"1
49 Hawaii 160, 413 P.2d 221 (1966).
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$117,000, with plaintiff remaining in possession. The court found
this to be a loan, and usurious. Redemption was ordered for $90,00
120
plus one percent interest at the maximum rate allowable by law.
The court might have found that the sale-leaseback was an equitable mortgage and order redemption on the grounds that the limited life of the repurchase option transaction was an invalid attempt to preclude redemption. But the usury analysis is superior
since it focuses on the true nature of the injustice-which is the
amount of the enrichment going to the lender, not its underlying
character as a property interest.
The theoretical analysis of a usury case begins at the same
place as a clogging claim: Is there in fact a loan? This is determined by reference to the intent of the parties in light of the
121
circumstances.
However, once beyond this always uncertain analysis of intent,
the logic of usury laws heads for solid ground by inquiring as to
the amount of benefit accruing to the lender. This is an obviously
superior approach to the clogging doctrine's examination of effects
upon redemption rights since it introduces an element of certainty
to the legal determination.
Further, a usury-based approach is unlikely to find a "forfeiture" of the Humble variety due to post-contract appreciation in
value, assuming that the lender has fairly bargained for the benefit
of this appreciation. The, Arizona Supreme Court explained this
succinctly: "The theory. . . is that where the lender risks the principal with the chance of. . .getting a greater return than the lawful interest rate . . . there is no usury, since '[u]sury laws do not
forbid the taking of business chances in the employment of
money.' "122
The theory implies rather directly that to the extent a mortgagee's option is a usurious benefit, the determination would have to
be made as of the time the contract granting the option was
123
made.
'Arguably, the relaxation of usury laws in recent years would
Id. at 190, 413 P.2d at 236.
See Swallow Ranches, Inc. v. Bidart, 525 F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1975).
,22Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 392, 351 P.2d 986, 991 (1960) (quoting RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 527, comment a (1956); Owens v. Conelly, 77 Ariz. 349, 272 P.2d 345
(1954)).
12" Cf. Roegge, supra note 8, at 626 (where concern is expressed that the courts might
not follow this approach).
120
121
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limit the effectiveness of the usury approach as a substitute for the
clogging rule. However, this cuts both ways. We live in an era when
relatively high interest rates are deliberately fostered in order to
control inflation. It makes scant sense for an equitable doctrine
largely developed to supplement usury laws to operate at cross
purposes with the policy underlying the relaxation of the usury
laws.
On balance, then, usury laws seem more capable than the clog124
ging doctrine of controlling much of the lender overreaching.
However, since usury laws look to amount, rather than the form of
benefit conferred, they would not be terribly helpful in preventing
unwitting small property owners from signing away their ownership interests. However, this is the sort of situation for which unconscionability doctrines are designed.
C. Unconscionability and Clogging: Close Theoretical Relatives
The mere mention of the term "unconscionability" should
trigger concern for definitions. When considering the overlap between the clogging doctrine and the law of unconscionability, this
concern is doubly necessary. The concept of unconscionability is a
major underpinning of most equitable doctrines. 1 25 This is obviously true with respect to the clogging doctrine.
It is useful to recognize that the term unconscionability is employed in two somewhat distinct senses.' 26 First, it denotes the
general ethical basis from which specific equitable doctrines have
124 Usury laws sensibly focus on the value of the economic benefit received by the
lender. All benefits, including options, have value. Therefore, the usury approach should be
capable of regulating options, except those options that are specifically designed to "thwart
equity." Of course the "equity-thwarting" option will never be found in an arms-length business deal.
Some states recognize that lenders are adequately regulated through market forces.
These states provide usury law exemptions for categories of transactions with minimal potential for lender overreaching. For example, in New York, corporations are prohibited from
interposing a civil usury defense. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1978). Further,
loans for amounts exceeding $250,000 are exempt from civil usury restrictions. If the
amount exceeds $2,500,000, criminal usury restrictions are removed as well. Id. at § 5-501(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Illinois takes a slightly different approach. Loans to corporate
borrowers are generally not subject to any interest rate regulation. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, §
4(a) (1966); Business purpose loans are similarly generally exempt from usury limits. Id.
Why not create either a business purpose exemption or an amount-based exemption to the
clogging rule? See discussion infra, Part IX, for a discussion of New York's recent

legislation.

' J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS
126 Id. at 320.

318 (1977).
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emerged and crystallized. 127 In this sense, it is entirely legitimate
to view the clogging doctrine as a type of per se unconscion1 28
ability.
However, the term is more often used to denote the direct application of these ethical precepts to specific fact patterns. Viewed
in this fashion, it seems somewhat disingenuous to bolster a clogging holding with an alternative holding of unconscionability, as
was done in Humble. If a clog is found, it should follow as a logical
point that the underlying contract is unconscionable. To present
unconscionability as an alternative ground for the holding is to tacitly admit that the clogging rule has outstripped its ethical
underpinnings.
Perhaps this goes to the heart of why the dog is unruly, in
Lord Mersey's terms. 129 When the doctrine against clogging
evolved, the sort of large arms-length transaction that occurred in
MacArthur could not have been envisioned. It may have been very
logical in an age of small individual mortgagees to crystallize a category of transactions and brand them as offensive.
The holding in Humble is an excellent illustration of how complete the overlap between clogging and unconscionability can be. 13 0
Barr is equally understood when considered as a general unconscionability holding-particularly since clogging was never mentioned.
D. Modern Theories of Unconscionability
A variety of theories have been proposed for the application of
the unconscionability doctrine since it found its way into the UCC.
Leff observed that "UCC unconscionability" is particularly appropriate to the mass market, since its emphasis on deviation from a
norm was well suited to form contracts. 13 ' This was to be distin27 Id. at 319.
228

This seems particularly apt when considered along with the cryptic language in Jen-

nings, 23 Eng. Rep. at 935, discussed supra note 22 and accompanying text.
129 Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage, 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) 802, 808 (1914).
"o This is not to say that the unconscionability holding in Humble is beyond criticism.
In light of the court's conclusion that the defendant understood the nature of the option
and even bargained over the option price to a limited extent, it seems debatable that the
granting of a purchase option for 50% more than the value of the station at the time of
entering into the contract is so harsh as to be unconscionable. Ostensibly, the holding
turned upon the short term of the leaseback to the defendant. Yet, the deal obviously would
not have been enforced were it not for the existence of the option.
"' Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
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guished from equitable unconscionability, which was, in his view,
more appropriate for unique items such as real estate. He further
subdivided the concept into procedural or bad conduct and substantive or bad result unconscionability. 3 2 While it is debatable
whether courts accept this distinction,13 3 it is useful for descriptive
purposes. At a minimum this approach would seem to be theoretically suitable for preventing mortgagors from signing away their
redemption rights without changing the result in cases, such as
MacArthur, which did not involve bad conduct or bad result.
Ellinghaus suggested that in some circumstances the nature of
the bargain itself, without reference to the behavior of the parties,
could trigger a holding of unconscionability 3 4 Unfortunately, this
reasoning with its per se emphasis was probably responsible for
the modern clogging confusion. But, even so, the facial analysis of
a mortgage transaction for injustice is more rational than a property analysis in the clogging context, since it appears less likely to
cause injustice.
Eisenberg proposed that the unconscionability doctrine should
be applied to contracts in four situations, which he termed distress, transactionalincapacity,unfair persuasion and price ignorance.31 5 Distress would cover forms of virtual duress that do not
include wrongful conduct by the plaintiff. 3 6 Transactional incapacity would include situations that stop far short of true contractual incapacity.13 7 It typically would protect an ignorant party who
entered a highly complex commercial transaction and was fleeced
in the process. Unfair persuasion would protect victims of undue
influence in the absence of a confidential relation.13 His final category proposes that exploiting price ignorance in some circumstances might also be unconscionable. 3 9
These categories paint a fairly comprehensive picture of the
R.v. 485, 489 (1967).
132

Id.

133See 1 A. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1951 and Supp. 1984).
3' Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78 YAE L.J. 757, 789 (1969). Compare
In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (unfair conduct must be
present) with Campbell Soup Co. v. Wertz, 172 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1948) (a harsh bargain is
enough).
13 See generally Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv.
741, 741 (1982).
I Id. at 754-55.
3 Id. at 763-73.
18 Id. at 773-78.
139 Id. at 778-85.
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directions we are likely to see in the future development of the law
of unconscionability. As a gauge of the likely outer limits of the
unconscionability doctrine, it is worth noting that the first three
categories would seem capable of completely supplanting the clogging doctrine in situations involving a genuinely unfair sort of deal.
However, unlike the clogging doctrine, this relatively activist approach to unconscionability appears to allow businessmen to continue to strike reasonable bargains.
E.

Applying Unconscionability to Mortgages

Goldstein, after briefly touching upon much of the same material discussed supra at part VI D, 14 0 noted that Humble's unconscionability holding rests in part on a New Jersey Supreme Court
case that applied UCC section 2-302.141 Thus, he suggests that in a
limited sense, UCC unconscionability has already crept into the
law of clogs. This analysis concluded that there are three separate
meanings ascribed to unconscionability:
1. Surprising and oppressive digressions from a norm in contract formation (the UCC concept).
2. Fair dealing in performance.
3. The traditional equity concept of not sanctioning a harsh
14 2
result.
In this framework, it should be clear that the modern law of
unconscionability is well equipped to assume the burden of regulating those transactions that are truly unfair, without impeding
legitimate activities. Unconscionability has been used to support
the invalidation of an exorbitant interest charge.' 43 This suggests
that the doctrine might satisfactorily supplant any residual usury
44
prevention aspects of the clogging rule.1
Case law applying an unconscionability rationale to redemption rights is nearly always done in tandem with inevitable prop140

See generally Goldstein, Unconscionability:Some Reconsiderations with Particular

Reference to New Type Mortgage Transactions, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 412 (1982)
[hereinafter Goldstein]. Mr. Goldstein's article, cited herein, suggested some of the comparisons made in the text accompanying notes 132-40 supra.
"4 Id. at 416. Humble approvingly cites Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528,
236 A.2d 843 (1967). Id.
142 Goldstein, supra note 140,'at 417.
M43
See, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964).

'44 See Kane, The Mortgagee's Option to PurchaseMortgaged Property,in FINANCING

REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY

80s 123, 126 (A.B.A. 1981)
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erty analysis. 14 5 However, the reasoning of Humble certainly implies that the unconscionability doctrine is every bit as broad as a
genuinely oppressed mortgagor might wish.
It is difficult to understand the survival of the clogging rule in
light of the potential power of the unconscionability doctrine. Perhaps, it reflects the courts' reluctance to rule forthrightly based on
unconscionability alone, which typified sale of goods transactions
prior to UCC section 2-302.14e This suggests that enactment of
ULTA section 1-311,147 which is similar to UCC section 2-302,
might be a useful and appropriate adjunct to reform of the clogging rule.
VII.

THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE CLOGGING DOCTRINE UPON
MODERN TRANSACTIONS

Generally, despite the doctrine's broad language, American
U4 But see Bunbury v. Winter, 37 Eng. Rep. 372, 375 (1820) (redemption denied because there was no unfairness in the arrangement). See also Bogerding Inv. Co. v. Larson,
284 Minn. 371, 170 N.W.2d 322 (1969) (apparent clog on the equity of redemption invalidated largely on unconscionability grounds).
148 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 125, at 317.
'4' Unif. Land Transactions Act § 1-311, 13 U.L.A. 502 (1986). The section reads as
follows:
[Unconscionable Agreement or Term of Contract]
(a) The court, upon finding as a matter of law that a contract or contract clause
was unconscionable at the time the contract was made, may refuse to enforce the
contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or limit the application of any unconscionable clause in order to avoid an unconscionable result.
(b) Whenever it is claimed, or appears to the court, that a contract or any contract
clause is or may be unconscionable, the parties, in order to aid the court in making the determination, shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to:
(1) the commercial setting of the negotiations;
(2) whether a party has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of
the other party reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical
or mental infirmity, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of
the agreement, or similar factors;
(3) the effect and purpose of the contract or clause; and
(4) if a sale, any gross disparity, at the time of contracting, between the
amount charged for the real estate and the value of the real estate measured by the price at which similar real estate was readily obtainable in
similar transactions, but a disparity between the contract price and the
value of the real estate measured by the price at which similar real estate was readily obtainable in similar transactions does not, of itself,
render the contract unconscionable.
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courts have reached just results in given situations. However, arguments to extend the clogging doctrine into less appropriate transactions continue to surface.
In Powell v. Bastian,"' plaintiff owned a home subject to approximately $13,000 in encumbrances. Facing foreclosure, she
deeded the property to defendant for $16,000 and retained an option to repurchase it for $18,000 within 3 months. She found a
buyer willing to pay $20,500, exercised the option, made a $2,500
profit on the deal, and sued for damages. Judgment was rightly for
defendant, but a vigorous dissenting opinion maintained that the
transaction was usurious, unconscionable and a clog on her equity
of redemption.1 4
The rumblings extend quite far afield from sales with repurchase options. Concern exists that clogs might be found in the entire gamut of modern real estate financing techniques. Potential
targets of attack include convertible mortgages, shared appreciation mortgages, 150 variable rate mortgages1 51 and due-on-sale
clauses.1 52
148

541 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1975).

119 Id. at 1132. (Maughan, C.J., dissenting). Here, the structure of the transaction (sale
with repurchase option) invited the application of the clogging rule, since, if it was intended
to be a loan, an equitable mortgage should have been found. Id. at 1130-1131 (Maughan,
C.J., dissenting). However, distinguishing intent to make a loan from some other intent can
be problematic. As the dissent demonstrates, once the loan intent is found, clogging, usury
and unconscionability follow naturally. Id. at 1129-1132 (Maughan, C.J., dissenting).
,50 Convertible mortgages and shared appreciation mortgages have been described previously in the text. See supra note 13, and the discussion in Part II.
151 Variable rate mortgages are a class of long term mortgage instruments in which the
interest rate is tied to some index (typically, the index might be based on the prevailing
market rate for funds or the institution's cost of funds). An initial interest rate is set, and
periodic upward or downward adjustments are made according to an agreed schedule (more
complex formulae are of course also possible). Like SAMs, the actual future payment
amounts are unknown when the loan is consummated. Maximum limits on the size of adjustments may be included in the loan contract. Also, as in the case of SAMs, variable rate
mortgages are often touted as inflation protection for the lender. However, unless the index
employed is in fact related to the inflation rate, it is more precise to consider variable rate
instruments as providing protection against fluctuations in the cost of money. This is an
important distinction considering the recent past, in which high real interest rates have
been associated with relatively low inflation rates. Aside from the clogging and unconscionability issues that may arise from large increases in payment amounts, these instruments
must be examined for potential conflicts with usury ceilings, state and federal regulations of
form and content, and possible restrictions on capitalization of interest. See generally Levin
and Roberts, supra note 13.
"I A mortgage may contain a due-on-sale clause, which gives the mortgagee the right to
accelerate payment of the mortgage if the mortgagor sells or conveys the land without the
written consent of the mortgagee. Such a clause simply allows the lender to accelerate ma-
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However, the most worrisome transaction is the large real estate joint venture. Here, both mortgage and equity are intrinsic to
the deal. When real estate joint ventures were in their infancy, the
equity interest taken by the institutional investor may well have
been viewed by developers as an inducement for a mortgage loan.
Yet today, it is more realistic to treat the mortgage as an inducement for the developer to go into what is fundamentally an equity
deal. Institutional investors bring expertise and expectations to the
modern joint venture that reflect an interest in sharing profits, risk
153 It
of loss, and the possibility of appreciation from the outset.
makes little sense to apply the clogging rule here because the very
structure of the deal argues against an inference of lender overreaching. Nevertheless, a typical joint venture is vulnerable to the
logic of the clogging doctrine, since any equity interest obtained by
a mortgagee would seem to be incompatible with the notion "once
1 54
a mortgage, always a mortgage.'
One method by which a joint venture might avoid the reach of
the clogging rule would be the use of corporate form, 5 5 but incorporation will generally be economically unacceptable to a real estate joint venture. 56 The only escape would appear to be the legitimate joint venture exception, occasionally alluded to, 5 7 but never
turity if an unauthorized sale takes place. R.
TicE

§

KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRAC-

125 (1972).
See Roegge, supra note 8, at 597-98.
See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at § 1193.
As Norstrand points out, hybrid debt-equity financing is well accepted in corporate
law because the instruments themselves are statutorily authorized, despite the fact that
comparable real property mortgages might be found to be clogs on the equity of redemption.
Norstrand, supra note 16 at 29. However, hybrid instruments would not necessarily be required to set up a real estate joint venture in corporate form-"garden variety" debt instruments, preferred and common stock would often suffice. It follows that these less exotic but
no less statutorily authorized instruments would be similarly immune from clogging attack.
:' See Roegge, supra note 8, at 597-98.
'57 The court in Humble suggested that such an exception would not be inconsistent
with its own reasoning: "Different rules may also apply where an oil company is a true joint
venturer with the owner-lessor or where it started out as the owner of the property." 123
N.J. Super. 530, 559, 303 A.2d 898, 913 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973).
In Kreglinger, there is dicta directly suggestive of such an exception to the rule. The
Lord Chancellor took the position that the doctrine should not be a crystallized technical
rule but should be applied with a view towards the policies underlying it. He stated that an
arrangement "to take permanently into the firm a new partner as a condition of obtaining
fresh capital in the form of a loan" was "plainly collateral" and therefore permissible.
Kreglinger v. Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., 109 L.T.R. (n.s.) 802, 806 (1914). Lord
Parker, whose position was more technical than the Lord Chancellor's, felt that the rule was
primarily designed to prevent penalties in mortgage transactions and, as such, was a rule of
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directly ruled upon.
Some comfort can be taken from cases that have seemingly
more or less exempted the joint venture from usury laws. 5 8 However, the case law does not go so far as to "exempt" loans executed
in the context of a joint venture. Rather, the cases reiterate the
propositions that usury laws only apply to loans, and a joint venture is not a loan. 159
A student comment points out that there is an inherent clog in
the shared appreciation mortgage, or SAM. 160 SAMs come in a variety of forms, but generally function so as to give the borrower a
low initial rate of interest. This is accomplished by granting the
lender a portion of the appreciation in value of the property which
is called interest, and payable either upon sale or upon refinancing.16' Unfortunately, if the property appreciates too much in
value, this could be detrimental to the borrower. Upon refinancing
the mortgage, the higher payments necessary to pay the bank its
"appreciation" could force a forfeiture of sorts, since the borrower
might be forced into sale or default. Even though the borrower
would walk away from the foreclosure with cash from a proportionate share of the appreciation as well as any initial investment, it is
difficult to predict how an equity court might respond to what
seems like a combination of "duress of circumstance and mistaken
self-confidence."'1 2 SAMs also have a theoretical problem because
they grant a contingent interest contract right to the lender that
behaves very much like an equity interest.
It has also been suggested that the due-on-sale clauses may
violate the clogging rule.' 63 The argument is that the borrower's
intent effectuation. He hypothesized a person !ending money to a firm secured by a mortgage on partnership property in return for an option to buy a partnership interest for the
loan balance. This, he reasoned, was something "more complex" than a mortgage. Id. at 810.
Therefore, the rule should not be applied. Thus, two leading authorities that otherwise appear irreconcilable would seem to leave room for agreement that a mortgagee's option to
purchase a partnership interest that is granted as part of an arrangement to admit a new
partner to the partnership should not be invalidated by the clogging rule.
"I8 See, e.g., Stark v. Bauer Cooperage Co., 3 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1925); Orvis v. Curtis,
157 N.Y. 657, 52 N.E. 690 (1899).
'I' "[I]t is not seen how such an arrangement as this is obnoxious. . . .It is. . .a joint
adventure." Stark, 3 F.2d at 217; see also Orris, 157 N.Y. 657, 52 N.E. 690 (1899) (joint
venture not founded upon loan thus usury inapplicable as defense).
180 Comment, supra note 13.
,' Id. at 150. See supra note 13 for a more detailed discussion of these instruments.
182 Note, supra note 98, at 648-49.
,13 Falk, Due-On-Sale Clauses and Clogging the Equity of Redemption, 36 WASH. &
LEE

L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1979).
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ability to sell his equity of redemption is an incident of ownership
and thus, any inhibition of that right is a forfeiture of sorts. This
reasoning has not won court acceptance, but at least one dissenting
64
opinion has embraced it.1
A due-on-sale clause does not prevent a borrower from tendering payment in foreclosure or from selling. However, the argument
6 5 where nonpropounded is not a very large leap from Hill v. Day,"
assignability of an option was considered a clog. Thus, it would not
be surprising if this theory resurfaces.
Overall, we are confronted with a state of the law that is
fraught with uncertainty concerning the more innovative recent
developments in real estate finance. Even the adjustable rate mortgage would seem to be subject to attack. Consider a recent comment by a specialist in the field: "They [adjustable rate mortgages]
encourage people to over-commit and think they can manage
something they can't."'66 This comment sounds like a policy argument for applying the rule against clogs. 16 7 However, the area of
greatest concern to the real estate practitioner should be the enforceability of a mortgagee's option to buy an interest in the secured property.
VIII. LIVING WITH THE RULE
Kane analyzed the American case law alongside Kreglinger
and concluded there were two paths an investor might realistically
follow to skirt the perimeters of the clogging doctrine. 6 8
The first approach would apply to transactions where there is
a genuine intent to sell and purchase with an incidental mortgage.
In this scenario, the mortgagor might genuinely wish to sell his
property at a later date for some sound reason, such as delaying
recognition of a capital gain. Similarly, the mortgagee-purchaser
may wish to delay purchase in order to observe the progress of a
164 Lincoln Mortgage Invs. v. Cook, 659 P.2d 925, 930 (Okla. 1982) (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'e' 231 Ark. 550, 331 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. 1960).
'e Jack Guttenberg, quoted by Brooks, Talking Adjustables, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1983, § 8, at 12.
"87In fact, the theory of the clog in the SAM applies with nearly the same force to the
adjustable (variable) rate mortgage, since the attack in both instances is predicated on the
large jump in monthly payments that might shatter a borrower's "mirage of hope." See
Wyman,supra note 56, at 472.
"88Kane, supra note 144, at 126-27.
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development. 169 In these situations, where the mortgage is for

purchase money and is intended to be incidental to an outright
purchase, the suggested approach is to document the primary intent in the agreement and any ancillary communications. 70 This is
a sound practice and would doubtless find considerable support in
the case law, but it still runs squarely into some of the broader
language of the clogging decisions.
If the sale and purchase approach simply doesn't prevent the
application of the clogging doctrine, an alternative suggestion is to
grant the mortgagor a right to negate the mortgagee's option by
payment of a premium. Assuming no overreaching, this should be
7

equitably sufficient.1

1

Preble and Cartwright 7 2 make clogging some detailed suggestions for "minimizing the application of the rule."' 73 They suggest
that the mortgage and option should be negotiated and documented as separate transactions. The option should be recorded
and take priority over the mortgage. The option fee should be
nominal, the exercise price should substantially equal fair market
value at the time the option is granted and the exercise should not
be permitted until a fixed time period has passed or some contingency occurs that is not related to default. Exercise of the option
should cancel the indebtedness. In this approach, the borrower will
also receive a right to "call" the optionee's interest for fair market
value at the time of the call. If the option is for less than 100% of
the borrower's interest in the property, the borrower may "put"
the remainder to the optionee for fair market value at the time of
exercise of the option.7 4 Additionally, the use of a clogging estoppel certificate from the borrower and a favorable clogging opinion
75
from borrower's counsel is recommended.1

169

170

Id.

Id.

Id. But see Biggs v. Hodinott, [1898] 2 Ch. 307, and its discussion of French v.
Baron, 2 Atk. 120 (1740), which, as perhaps suggested by the discussion in note 46 supra,
may be some (albeit ancient) authority for the notion that the "premium" suggested to
undo the option may itself be considered a clog on the equity of redemption. Of course, if
the premium is not unconscionable, this should not be the result.
172 Preble and Cartwright, Convertible and Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclogging
the Equity of Redemption, 20 REAL PROP. PROs. & TR.J. 821 (1985).
171 Id. at 856.
174 When a right in the nature of an option confers upon the holder thereof the right to
buy certain property, it is often denominated a "call." If the holder receives the right to sell
certain property, it will be called a "put." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 986 (5th ed. 1979).
171 Preble and Cartwright, supra note 172, at 857-58. Messrs. Preble and Cartwright
"7
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It is apparent, though, that even in the highly circumscribed
arrangements described above, a lender wishing to share in the appreciation of the secured property risks an adverse application of
the clogging rule. This is a particularly difficult problem in situations where mortgagee's option to buy at a price below the current
fair market value. There is little authority for sustaining the validity of even clearly "conscionable" transactions.
In the absence of clear case law guidance, it would seem that
the broader implications of the rule may need to be accepted as a
risk of doing business. In any transaction having the arguable indicia of an equitable mortgage the practitioner should beware that
the clogging rule may become a factor.
IX.

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

Easy solutions seem elusive. Norstrand pointed out that the
drafters of the UCC did not seem concerned about permitting
waiver of redemption rights in UCC section 9-506.17 This is somewhat glib since the waiver permitted in the Code is part of a comprehensive procedure for dealing with secured transactions. Fur177
ther, it is subject to the Code's general obligations of good faith.
It seems unlikely that the clogging doctrine could be legislatively abolished without encouraging the growth of the law of unconscionability in the most worrisome area-mixed debt and equity financing. Yet the growth of unconscionability law seems
inevitable. The unconscionability doctrine is theoretically sounder
than the clogging doctrine and inherently less likely to interfere
with arms-length bargains fairly struck.
Recently, several significant legislative initiatives have been
put forth in an effort to remove the mortgagee's option from the
purview of the clogging doctrine. One initiative takes the form of
Section 211 of the recently passed Uniform Land Security Interest
Act ("ULSIA"). 1 7 A second initiative is a recently enacted New
provide helpful samples of the recommended estoppel certificate. Id. at 867-69. They wisely
further suggest that such arrangements should never be entered into by lenders with unsophisticated borrowers. Id. at 859.
:76 Norstrand, supra note 16, at 29.
' See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
176 Unif. Land Security Interest Act § 211, 7A U.L.A. 31 (1986). The ULSIA was
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its August
1985 meeting. It is derived from the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA"] but deals
only with secured transactions in real estate. Section 211 of the USLIA replaces ULTA
Section 3-211, which read:
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York State statute. Both seek to validate the mortgagee's option to
purchase interests in property secured by the mortgage. However,
their approaches and purported coverage differ.
The ULSIA Section, which replaces a relatively new provision
of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, reads:
Section 211. Secured Party's Equity in Collateral.
Notwithstanding a rule denominated "fettering," clogging the equity of redemption," or "claiming a collateral advantage" or a rule
of similar import:
(1) a secured party may, without adversely affecting its security interest, may acquire from a debtor [other than a protected
party] any direct or indirect present or future ownership interest
in the collateral, including rights to any income, proceeds or increase in value derived from the collateral; and
(2) an option granted by a debtor [other' than a protected
party] to a secured party to acquire an interest in the collateral
takes priority as of the date of its recording and is effective according to its terms if the right to exercise the option is not dependent upon the occurrence of a default under the security
17 9

agreement.

This section would abrogate the application of the clogging
doctrine to a mortgagee's option to purchase an interest in the collateral, provided that the option's exercise is not conditioned on
default. Additionally, the priority of the option would be preserved
by the recording. The bracketed words would give a state the option of complete abrogation of the rule with respect to mortgagee's
options, or retention of the rule's protection for small residential
borrowers. 180 The ULSIA provision goes further, however, and
Notwithstanding a rule denominated "fettering," "clogging the equity of redemption", or "claiming a collateral advantage" or a rule of similar import, an option

granted by a debtor [other than a protected party] to a secured party to acquire
an interest in the collateral takes priority as of the date of its recording and is

effective according to its terms if the right to exercise the option is not dependent
upon the occurrence of a default under the security agreement.

Unif. Land Transactions Act § 3-211, 13 U.L.A. 589 (1986). Unlike the current USLIA Section 211, this section does not protect hybrid debt-equity instruments and related arrangements from the purview of the clogging doctrine.

171 Unif. Land Security Interest Act § 211, 7A U.L.A. 31 (1986). The author was furnished with an early draft of the as yet unpublished USLIA by Norman Geis, Esq., Chicago,

Illinois. Mr. Geis, whose assistance the author gratefully acknowledges, represented the
American College of Real Estate Lawyers on the Drafting Committee for the Act.
'8* ULSIA Section 113 defines a "protected party" as follows:
Section 113. Protected Party: Residential Real Estate.
(a) "Protected party" means:
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broadly validates many of the alternative mortgage provisions that,
ironically, may in some circumstances be more likely to be upheld
in a residential context than in a commercial transaction. This is
due to the federal preemption provisions of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982.181

The New York statute adds a new section to the General Obligations Law:
Section 5-334. Option or right to acquire interest in property.
1. An option or right to acquire an equity or other ownership interest in property or in a partnership, corporation, trust or other
entity that owns property shall not be unenforceable because the
owner of such interest grants such option or right to the holder of
a mortgage which is a lien on such property or to the holder of a
security interest in such property, simultaneously with or in connection with any loan or forbearance of money secured by such
mortgage or security interest, if (a) the power to exercise such
option or right is not dependent upon the occurrence of a default
with respect to such loan, forbearance, mortgage or security interest, and (b) such loan or forbearance is for the principal sum of
two million five hundred thousand dollars or more when the option or right is granted. Loans or forbearances aggregating two
million five hundred thousand dollars or more which are to be
made or advanced to any one borrower in one or more installments pursuant to a written agreement by one or more lenders
shall be deemed a single loan or forbearance for the total amount
which the lender or lenders have agreed to make or advance pursuant to such agreement.
(1) an individual who gives a security interest in residential real estate all or a
part of which the individual occupies or intends to occupy as a residence;
(2) a person obligated primarily or secondarily on an obligation secured by
residential real estate if, at the time he [or she] becomes obligated, that person is
related to an individual who occupies or intends to occupy all or a part of the real
estate as a residence; or
(3) an individual who acquires residential real estate and assumes or takes
subject to the obligation of a prior protected party under the real estate security
agreement.
(b) "Residential real estate" means, in relation to a protected party, real estate,
improved or to be improved, containing not more than [three] acres, not more
than four dwelling units, and no nonresidential uses for which the protected party
is a lessor. If a unit in a common interest community is otherwise "residential real
estate," it remains so regardless of the size of, or the number of units in, the common interest community.
Unif. Land Security Act § 113, 7A U.L.A. 27 (1986). This irony was noted by Mr. Geis,
supra note 179, in one of several helpful conversations with the author.
...12 U.S.C. § 3804 (1982 and Supp. 1985).
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2. This section shall not be construed to limit, impair or otherwise
affect the power of the holder of any option or right to acquire an
equity or other ownership interest in property or in a partnership,
corporation, trust or other entity that owns property, if such option or right is or would be enforceable without reference to this
section.
3. This section shall apply to all options or rights which are exercised on or after the effective date of this section, notwithstanding the date when such options or rights were granted." 2
The New York approach provides that an option to purchase property in securing a debt shall not not be unenforceable because the
option is granted to the lien holder. However, two conditions must
be satisfied. First, the exercise of the option must not be conditioned upon occurrence of default. Second, the secured loan must
equal or exceed two and one half million dollars when the option is
granted, or be part of a written package of loan commitments that
aggregate the same sum.183
The New York statute explicitly covers a mortgagee's option
to purchase an interest in the entity owning the secured property.
ULSIA section 211 should impliedly accomplish the same result,
since it explicitly mentions the clogging rule. However, while New
York retains the clogging rule for all transactions to which criminal
usury laws are applicable, by virtue of the dollar amount threshold,18 4 the ULSIA provision would completely abrogate the clogging rule, or alternatively retain it only for the far narrower class of
protected parties. l 5 Both initiatives preclude circumvention of
normal foreclosure procedures by excluding from statutory coverage those options that are conditionally exercisable on default.
Perhaps the major difference between the two statutory sections lies not in the transactions covered but in the potential scope
of their legal effect. The New York approach would seem to impliedly remove the unconscionability defense, as well as any other
defense based on the optionee's status of mortgagee. However,
ULSIA section 211 goes further since it explicitly validates the enforceability of the transactions it purports to cover.
The ULSIA provision is likely to provide a desirable degree of
182

N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW

§ 5-334 (McKinney 1978 and Supp. 1986).

183 Id.

184 See supra note 124, for a description of New York's statutory usury scheme, which
employs a parallel dollar threshold approach.
85 See supra note 180.
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certainty to the enforceability of sophisticated real estate financing
agreements. The New York statute, while certainly an improvement over the existing state of law, may give rise to some troublesome implications since it fails to foreclose the re-emergence of the
clogging doctrine in new settings such as the various hybrid debtequity arrangements." 6 USLIA section 211 seems clearly preferable in this respect.
In seeking to protect the mortgagee's option from the clogging
doctrine, the California legislature enacted the following Civil Code
section in 1984:
Section 2906. Secured party: Option to acquire interest in real
property collateral; Priority; Validity. An option granted to a secured party by a debtor to acquire an interest in real property
collateral takes priority as of its recording and is effective according to its terms if the right to exercise the option is not dependent upon the occurrence of a default with respect to the security
agreement and, where the real property which is the subject of
the option is other than residential real property containing four
or fewer units, shall not be deemed invalid or ineffective on the
basis that the secured party has impaired the debtor's equity of
redemption in violation of common law or Section 2889. [Section
2889 invalidates "contracts for forfeiture of property subject to a
lien, in satisfaction of the obligation secured thereby, and all contracts in restraint of the right of redemption from a lien."] 8 7 This
section shall not be construed to make valid or effective an otherwise unlawful option nor shall any inference be drawn from this
section as to the validity or application of common law with respect to residential real property containing four or fewer units. 18
This statute is similar to ULSIA section 211 to the extent that
it abolishes the application of the clogging rule to purchase options
granted to real property mortgagees outside the realm of small residential mortgages. It also incorporates the strongest part of the
New York approach by affirming the enforceability of those options that it covers. Further, the last sentence of the California section takes a measured approach towards eliminating any undesirable implications through its attempt to restrain both the positive
and negative implications of option enforceability. In this respect,
the California approach may be preferable to New York's, however,
186 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
SCAL. Civ. CODE § 2889 (West 1974).
188 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2906 (West 1974 and Supp.

1986).
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neither state has effected the kind of broad ranging rationalization
of the law that is epitomized by the ULSIA provision.

X.

THE CLOGGING RULE HAS OUTLIVED ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE

At the very least, the law of clogs on the equity of redemption
is in a confused state. Language can be found in the leading cases
that could either uphold or invalidate a substantial number of
modern real estate financing techniques. To the extent that this
uncertainty discourages the development of creative approaches to
real estate finance, the rule's application contradicts modern economic thinking.
The development of the clogging doctrine was deeply rooted in
the English usury laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ironically, the doctrine has persisted beyond its moral
purpose.
Ultimately, clogging is a child of the equitable unconscionability concept. Yet, the parent seems far more modern than the child.
While Lord Mersey's unruly dog wanders, unwanted, into the
world of modern real estate finance, twentieth century unconscionability law has been maturing into a legal tool that appears better
designed to regulate the original target of clogging.
Has the unruly dog become a dinosaur? Perhaps this question
is overly metaphysical. But, clearly, the rule against clogging the
equity of redemption has become a danger to the ordinary transaction of ordinary business deals. When unruly dogs become dangerous, we euphemistically speak of "putting them to sleep." After
three and one half centuries in defense of impecunious landowners,
the rule deserves a final resting place as well.

